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CHARTING A NEW COURSE
The Knox-Pye-King Board and Naval Professional Education,
1919–23
David Kohnen

E

ducation occurs in many forms within the context of military organizations,
whether during peace or war. Training often reflects the prevailing doctrines,
as prescribed within the hierarchical context of rank-oriented organizations. The
nexus between education and training remains an uncharted area of historical
interest among contemporary military thinkers. As we look beyond the present
to the unexplored frontier of the future, the past may offer some perspective on
the question of professional military education.
Given these broad assertions, this article focuses on the problem of education within the U.S. Navy of the First World War era. In considering the efforts
of Captains Dudley W. Knox and Ernest J. King of a century ago, contemporary
practitioners may recognize familiar trends concerning the future of professional
military education. Throughout their careers of
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particularly at the higher levels of command, as having been fundamentally
unequipped, from an educational perspective, to perform within the context
of the First World War. Broadly, USN officers suffered from ignorance after
being educated by the Naval Academy “only in preparation for the lowest commissioned grade.”1 In making this provocative assertion, Knox and King drew
inspiration from their personal interactions with a variety of ranking officers. In
particular, King and Knox recalled the “salt horse” culture that had prevailed in
their First World War dealings with such figures as Royal Navy (RN) admiral Sir
David Beatty and USN admirals Henry B. Wilson and Hugh Rodman. Reputations centered on questions of seamanship and years of practical experience;
King railed against this in his characterizations of Beatty and with his observation that “Wilson, like Rodman and some other senior officers, distrusted ‘book
learning.’”2 Acting on their assertions, Knox and King collaborated with Pye to
stage an educational revolution from within the middle ranks of the Navy after
the First World War.
Admirals Henry T. Mayo and William S. Sims provided inspiration and bureaucratic “top cover” for their protégés Knox and King. In keeping with the
tribal culture that defined the American naval service at that time, the individuals in question all maintained strong professional connections with each other.
Transcending their initial Naval Academy education, they adopted the prevailing Navy-wide culture that viewed the service more as a fraternal society than a
lifelong vocation.3 During the first fifty years of the twentieth century, American
naval officers demonstrated such commitment that Henry L. Stimson characterized them as being almost religious about their profession. Having served in a
number of presidential administrations (twice as Secretary of War and once as
Secretary of State), Stimson grew to respect the “peculiar psychology of the Navy
Department, which frequently retired from the realm of logic into a dim religious
world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States
Navy the only true church.”4
JUST BELOW THE SURFACE OF NAVAL HISTORY
The problem of education and its underlying strategic importance to the U.S.
Navy was reflected in efforts to define the naval profession. The unresolved fight
over professional education in the Navy of the nineteenth century also defined
the early twentieth-century perspectives of Knox, Pye, and King.5 To place their
perspectives into a historical context: Navies traditionally had required personnel with technical expertise in the sciences, rather than the humanities, for the
practical purposes of operating and maintaining ships. Drawing from the ideas of
British historians such as Sir John Knox Laughton and Spenser Wilkinson, Rear
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Admiral Stephen B. Luce, USN, stirred debate after he established the Naval War
College in Newport, Rhode Island, in 1884.6 His protégé Captain Alfred Thayer
Mahan also considered the problem in one of his earliest writings, in 1879. In an
article entitled “Naval Education,” Mahan challenged the prevailing attitude of
the Navy Department bureaucracy, arguing that the historical functions of the sea
services should be considered a national investment.7 He encouraged Americans
to seize a future economic stake in the international context. To this end, Mahan
pressed for the development of a strong merchant marine and a credible navy to
participate in the global maritime arena.8
Historically, navies comprised seagoing practitioners of multiple social backgrounds and cultural identities. In considering the historical and social dimensions of maritime strategy, Mahan warned the U.S. Navy to avoid overemphasizing the “necessarily materialistic character of mechanical science,” which “tends
rather to narrowness and low ideals.”9 He also considered the historical nexus of
peace and war to be an uncharted area of consistent strategic interest for future
historical discussion. By comparison with other navies in the global maritime
arena, the U.S. Navy was among the least remarkable from a technical perspective
in 1890, when Mahan gained international fame with the publication of his The
Influence of Sea Power upon History. Mahan acknowledged technologies as a variable, but he encouraged fellow naval professionals to seek a deeper understanding of the maritime arena. “Nevertheless,” Mahan lamented, his fellow American
naval professionals tended to suffer from a “vague feeling of contempt for the
past, supposed to be obsolete, [that] combine[d] with natural indolence to blind
men even to those permanent strategic lessons which lie close to the surface of
naval history.”10
The culture of the American naval service reflected the scientifically oriented
curriculum of the U.S. Naval Academy. Naval Academy training conditioned
midshipmen to follow the rules, adopt a mathematical approach to solving problems through a “concentration on fractions,” and accept rote doctrinal solutions.
The Naval Academy engineered the development of practitioners to become tactically minded masters of seamanship. Before the First World War, the formulaic
approach of the Naval Academy curriculum fueled a counterproductive culture
within the Navy, beginning when the “average midshipman, reluctant to admit
his ignorance, would stand at the blackboard chewing chalk rather than ask a
question.”11 On graduation, junior practitioners sought to earn reputations for
competence by offering scientifically framed empirical answers in their interactions with the more seasoned, seagoing salt horses among the senior ranks of the
Navy.12 Junior officers refuted their senior-ranking counterparts at their peril,
which tended to stratify further the ranks of the Navy.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 123

3

5/1/18 11:11 AM

124

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 3, Art. 8

Thus, the Naval Academy indoctrinated graduates to take a mathematical approach to solving abstract problems, and the hierarchical system of bureaucracy
and ranking by lineal seniority governed the culture of the service; however, these
tendencies only somewhat overshadowed the underlying nuances and informality that operated among individual personalities. These group dynamics among
associated individuals that characterized the underlying culture of the service
also influenced the development of professional education in the Navy. William
S. Sims served as one nexus for such informal but important associations.
Having spent thirteen years in Canada in his youth, Sims returned to the United States shortly after the Civil War. In his youth he constantly sought adventure,
avoided working for grades in school, and assumed the nickname “Bloody Bill.”13
He considered pursuing a career as an artist. But as the U.S. Navy went through
a technological transformation from the era of wooden ships and sail to that of
steel and steam, Sims also found inspiration in the progressive vision of the Navy,
which provided opportunities to operate on the cutting edge of technology, and
he successfully sought an appointment to the Naval Academy. He performed
well as a student but poorly as a midshipman, earning a reputation for collecting
demerits. Sims proudly remembered running afoul of one instructor: Lieutenant
Commander Alfred Thayer Mahan. Standing watch on campus, Mahan sternly
punished Sims for being “disorderly on the quarterdeck and disrespectful to the
officer of the deck.”14 Sims nearly failed to meet the requirements for graduation
from the academy, but long before he graduated in 1880 he had earned a reputation within the ranks.
Sims directly participated in a period of revolutionary changes in both technology and American strategy. For him, rank held no great significance in the
pursuit of a shared vision of a U.S. Navy “second to none.”15 Combat experiences
further solidified the unique connections among individuals that characterized
the culture of the American sea services. During the 1900 Boxer Rebellion in
Asiatic waters, Sims became a close mentor to Knox and friendly with King. Beyond their shared interests in naval gunnery and battleship design, Sims enjoyed
discussing esoteric subjects in naval history with Knox and King. Later, as naval
aide to President Theodore Roosevelt, Sims continued nurturing ties with Knox
and King. In particular, Sims frequently traveled from Washington to Annapolis, where he called on King while the latter served as an instructor at the Naval
Academy.
With Sims acting as a common mentor, Knox and King developed a lifelong
friendship that originated in their shared fascination with maritime history. Both
served with Lieutenants Harry E. Yarnell and William S. Pye under Rear Admiral
Hugo W. Osterhaus in the Second Battleship Division of the Atlantic Fleet after
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1909. Knox and King collaborated with Yarnell and Pye in planning gunnery
exercises with the Royal Navy during a cruise to European waters in 1910. At
that time, Commander Sims reported into the Second Battleship Division in
command of the predreadnought USS Minnesota (BB 22).
Junior-ranking personnel frequently gained insight into the higher-ranking
politics of the Navy when they served on fleet staffs. Assignment under Osterhaus in the Atlantic Fleet provided such a perspective for Knox, King, and Pye.
Among other matters, they observed higher-ranking officers discussing the
controversial appointment of Sims to command Minnesota. In 1910, Sims stood
seventieth on a list of 120 officers in the rank of commander; such an assignment
usually was reserved for officers of a higher lineal seniority or of lower seniority in the rank of captain.16 Captain William S. Benson warned Sims to tread
carefully as skipper in Minnesota, as Sims’s connections to Roosevelt clearly had
influenced his assignment. Benson warned Sims that many naval officers thought
that the appointment “established a dangerous precedent of giving battleships to
Commanders.”17 On reporting for duty in Minnesota, Sims met with Osterhaus
and his relief, Rear Admiral Joseph B. Murdock. As the higher commanders set
all the details for the forthcoming cruise to European waters, they gossiped; and
observing from the corners were Knox, King, and Pye.18
Sims nurtured his reputation and carried himself with a cosmopolitan demeanor to attain celebrity status within the service. Beyond his close association
with Roosevelt, Sims had significant political influence through his wife, Anne,
and his father-in-law, Ethan Allen Hitchcock, the American ambassador to the
tsarist court of the Russian Empire. In addition, Sims boasted close friendships
with famous RN personalities, including the First Sea Lord, Sir John A. “Jackie”
Fisher; Captains Sir Percy M. Scott and Sir John R. Jellicoe also counted Sims
among their closest friends.19 The American officer anticipated the development
of a transatlantic relationship between the British Empire and the United States.
In celebrating the unique connection between the two maritime powers during a celebratory dinner at the Guildhall in London in December 1910, Sims
muddled his way into an international controversy. The scope of his remarks went
beyond official American policy, extending to a prospective Anglo-American
alliance. The New York Times characterized the Anglo-American celebrations at
the Guildhall as a “Love Feast.” “Had that speech been made by any other officer
below the rank of Captain in the Atlantic Fleet, except Sims,” one USN officer
suggested to the New York Times, “it’s dollars to doughnuts that no attention
would have been paid to it, but coming from Sims, who despite his rank and
youth is one of the best-known officers in the service, made it different.”20 For
his indiscretion, rivals within the service ensured that Sims was removed from
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command of Minnesota, which resulted in his extended exile away from the fast
track to higher command—as a student at the Naval War College in 1911.21
Sims recognized the assignment to the College as a punitive setback, which
likely carried personal consequences in the fierce competition for higher command among the seagoing ranks of the Navy. But Sims accepted his fate and committed himself to his studies. He soon recognized the broader value of historical
studies, informed debates in a classroom setting, and provocative argument in
written form.
The issue of professional education within the U.S. Navy remained unresolved
by the time Mahan died in 1914 and Luce in 1917. Sims took up their cause, as the
future of the Naval War College seemed bleak—particularly under the administration of Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels.
“REMAIN CHEERFUL”
Sims’s dashing reputation, coupled with his unique willingness to
buck the system, automatically inspired great respect from many junior officers within the ranks. In particular, Knox considered Sims
to be the “model of an American naval officer.”22 Personal correspondence between Sims and King also reflected a close friendship,
although King disingenuously recalled in his memoirs that he “was
never one of the group of Sims’s devoted disciples and followers.”23
As the First World War raged in Europe and Asia, Sims secured
orders to command the then-named Atlantic Fleet Destroyer and
Captain Dudley W. Knox, USN.
Torpedo Boat Flotilla in 1914. In this role, Sims employed Naval War
U.S. Navy photograph, courtesy North
College methods to inspire subordinate protégés to carry forward
Sturtevant
the cause of educating other seagoing practitioners of the Navy.
Pulling every bureaucratic string, Sims circumvented the Navy Department’s
detailing processes to arrange orders for a very select team of junior officers to
serve under his command in the flotilla. In particular, he pulled Knox from service in the tender USS Dixie (AD 1) and King from his assignment as skipper of
USS Terry (DD 25). In this role, King fell under the immediate operational command of Commodore Henry T. Mayo during the conduct of convoy-escort duties
in support of operations against the Mexican insurgency off Veracruz. Sims asked
King to leave command of Terry, with the enticement of “coming to the flotilla
to lend us a hand in the schemes we are trying to develop.”24 Sims sweetened the
proposal by offering King command of USS Cassin (DD 43). With Sims assuming
the Nelsonian role of senior mentor among equals, Knox and King assumed their
roles in the flotilla—the “band of brothers.”25
Service in the “Sims flotilla” inspired strategic connections among key personalities as the U.S. Navy carried out the transformation of its fleet from one
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dominated by coal-burning battleships to one of oil-powered warships of various
types and specialized capabilities. Among others on Sims’s flotilla staff, Commanders William V. Pratt, Joel R. P. Pringle, and Harry Yarnell helped foster
close bonds among the individual destroyer skippers, including Lieutenant Commanders Harold R. Stark, William F. “Bill” Halsey Jr., and Joseph K. Taussig.26 In
their personal correspondence, veterans of the Sims destroyer flotilla tended to
use the phrase “remain cheerful” as their parting salutation, denoting their mutual membership in a unique fraternity within the ranks of the Navy.27
Sims inspired subordinates to focus on a common vision and work together
as a team. He issued mandatory reading lists for his skippers to enable them to
participate in open wardroom discussions, whether on topics in naval history,
including reconstructions of past battles, or the testing of their current theories
during tabletop wargames. Sims referred to the atmosphere established among
the officers in the flotilla as a “War College afloat.”28 Through such open discussions, Sims and his staff developed totally new tactics for maneuvering destroyers in unison, using a wireless communications system of fewer than thirty-one
words.29 The cost savings resulting from conducting the developmental tests with
destroyers rather than the larger battleships enabled Sims and his men to pioneer
new tactics that could be applied to larger
fleet operations.
In the process, Sims himself transformed
from being a seagoing salt horse into a zealot
for the Naval War College brand of professional education. Such commitment to this
cause put him out of step with the political
agenda of Navy Secretary Daniels; Sims’s
relationship and dealings with Admiral
William S. Benson as the first Chief of Naval
Operations also remained tenuous. Given
the costs involved with maintaining a separate Naval War College, Daniels and Benson
judged the institution’s curriculum to be sufficiently analogous to that of the Army War
College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Given the
pressures of balancing budgets and political
horse trading within Congress, Daniels and
Benson endorsed the idea of a unified Army
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy (left), and Admiral William S. Benson,
and Navy war college, which could be estabChief of Naval Operations (right).
lished closer to the capital.30
Naval History and Heritage Command
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For Sims the idea of closing the Naval War College seemed outrageous, as
the U.S. Navy stood on the brink of potential involvement in the global conflict
already raging among the empires of Europe and Asia. He considered the fundamental differences between armies and navies so profound that the “Naval War
College should be made one of the principal assets of the Naval Service.”31 Against
the overarching emphasis that Daniels and Benson placed on the maintenance
of seagoing forces, Sims argued for the potential necessity of placing warships
“out of commission in order to avoid decreasing the efficiency of the education
of our officers.”32 Sims challenged fellow naval professionals to recognize the
strategic advantages to be derived from supporting the educational mission of
the Naval War College. With a clear purpose in mind, Sims articulated his points
in an article published in the Naval Institute Proceedings in mid-1916 under the
provocative title “Cheer Up!! There Is No Naval War College.”
In the article, Sims cited complaints from some within the seagoing ranks that
many of their colleagues needed a “dictionary to tell them the meaning of the
commonest terms.” Sims chastised critics of the Naval War College, suggesting
that they suffered from “wholly unpardonable ignorance,” then broadened his
charge: “When I went to the college . . . the service was very generally ignorant
of its purposes and the practical value of its teachings.” He deplored the failure
of many officers to understand “its vital importance to the efficient conduct of
our fleet.”33
Sims stated that he wished to “make plain that he [was] a thorough and enthusiastic advocate of the college.” The article characterized the Naval War College as
an educational forum wherein practitioners enjoyed freedom of discussion. Sims
offered the seemingly counterintuitive argument that there was
no War College, as the term “college” is usually understood. There is no president or
corps of professors who remain during life and good behavior and whose duty it is to
impose their conclusions upon the pupils. . . . [The] assemblage of officers is practically a board convened each year for the purpose of determining the best manner of
conducting naval warfare with vessels and weapons of ever-changing characteristics.
The staff of the college, generally fresh from the fleet and a course at the college,
presents the accepted principles of war, and the accepted manner of writing orders,
issues the rules of the war games to be played, and helps the pupils play them.34

After their interactions with officers of higher rank, Knox and King frequently
compared notes about their discussions of organizational and naval leadership.
Reflecting on his personal experiences, King noted that “Captain Sims himself
was an officer of extraordinary energy, but given to speaking with exaggeration”;
he observed that, for Sims, “all matters were clear white or dead black.” Although
King claimed to be less committed, Knox remained cheerfully associated with
Sims throughout the First World War and beyond. As head of the Planning
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Admiral Henry T. Mayo with Atlantic Fleet staff. Mayo’s chief of staff, Captain Ernest J. King, is at far left; his fleet intelligence officer, Commander William
S. Pye, is third from left, on the steps behind Mayo.
U.S. Navy photograph

Section in USN Headquarters in Europe, Knox frequently collaborated with
King and Pye, both of whom served on the seagoing staff of Admiral Henry T.
Mayo, the wartime commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet. Characterizing his
mentors, King thought that “Sims was flighty, Osterhaus steady, and Mayo was
the man for me.”35
Debates surrounding the practical functions of the Naval War College and
the role of higher education raged in the seagoing wardrooms and officers clubs
ashore, even as the U.S. Navy sailed over the horizon to participate in the first war
requiring American forces to operate within a strategic context of multinational
operations in foreign waters. Having assumed the presidency of the Naval War
College in the rank of captain in February 1917, Sims within weeks became commander of USN forces in Europe—largely by accident.36 By June, he was serving
in the temporary wartime rank of vice admiral (three stars). Yet Sims lacked a
clear prerogative to assert control over the warships now participating in ongoing
operations; instead they fell under the immediate command of his lineal senior
in rank, Mayo of the Atlantic Fleet.37
Nonetheless, Mayo and Sims collaborated in developing American naval
strategy by pioneering organizational means to harness the advantages of wireless
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communications and to enable naval
headquarters ashore to orchestrate the
interactions of operations and intelligence. To their great credit, Mayo and
Sims unified their collective strategic
efforts, empowering their immediate
subordinates to act with their authority
in planning multinational strategy, making recommendations governing USN
tactical forces in European waters, and
executing operational decisions. Relying
on their previous associations with those
who were now their subordinates, Mayo
and Sims empowered them to overcome
problems of command organization.
From within the “London Flagship”
headquarters, Sims authorized Knox
to work with King and Pye in mobilizing the forces of Mayo and the Atlantic
Vice Admiral William S. Sims, USN, as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe
during World War I.
Fleet. However, while Mayo and Sims
U.S. Navy photograph, courtesy Dr. Nathaniel Sims
established a great rapport, subordinate
Atlantic Fleet commanders such as Wilson and Rodman frequently challenged
Sims’s authority, which just as frequently required Mayo to promulgate directives
to enforce those of Sims.38
In dealings with foreign allies, the U.S. Navy suffered from intramural fighting
among its various disjointed commands. The parochialism and patriarchalism
within USN culture ultimately convinced Mayo to sign a memorandum concerning the Atlantic Fleet staff that had been drafted by Captains King and Donald
C. Bingham, with assistance from Commander Pye, under the title “Education
and Training of Officers for Staff Duty.”39 On February 20, 1919, in one of his last
acts as Atlantic Fleet commander, Mayo submitted the recommendations to the
Bureau of Navigation in Washington.
“Officers assigned to ‘staff duty’ should,” Mayo argued, have the “same viewpoint and perspective as that to which flag officers . . . have attained by reason of
their study, training, and long experience throughout their careers in the service.”
Mayo criticized the prevailing system of educating officers to master tactical
doctrines and technical functions governing shipboard routines rather than
subjects focused on higher strategic levels. He observed that the Navy suffered
from the “present lack of arrangements for the education and training of officers
for ‘staff duty.’” Mayo endorsed the Naval War College approach, arguing that the

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/8

10

Kohnen: Charting a New Course: The Knox-Pye-King Board and Naval Professi

KO H N E N

131

curriculum represented a prerequisite for
practitioners to succeed at higher levels
of command. He noted that the College’s
curriculum was “generally reserved for
the instruction of higher ranking officers”; as a result, the Naval War College
lacked “facilities of sufficient general
scope for the education and training of
officers for ‘staff duty.’”40
Mayo returned from the First World
War determined to address the fundamental problem of education within the
U.S. Navy. In 1919, he accepted reduction
from four- to two-star rank and a sunset advisory assignment to the General
Board of the Navy. He also arranged orders for his protégé King to assume command of the Naval Postgraduate School
at the Naval Academy in Annapolis.
After reporting for duty on May 1, King
Admiral William S. Sims with Admiral Henry T. Mayo in 1918.
U.S. Navy photograph
immediately lobbied the Navy Department for an expanded budget and additional personnel for the school.41
EDUCATION BEFORE THE MAST
The special bond among American naval practitioners influenced the development of professional identity within the Navy. Within the structured culture
of the naval service, sailors all stood essentially equal in the unique context of
shipboard life at sea. Skippers traditionally took responsibility for nurturing their
subordinates so that eventually they would earn commands of their own.
Seagoing experience prevailed in establishing reputations for higher command within the ranks of the Navy. Mayo and Sims stood out as advocates for
professional education among the salt-horse culture that persisted after the
First World War among the members of the elder generation of practitioners.
By contrast, their contemporaries in rank—particularly Benson, Rodman, and
Wilson—resisted challenges to the status quo. “The opinion has been generally
held in the Navy,” King noted, that the “only way to learn things is to do them,”
whereas “[b]ook learning [and] abstract knowledge is like fertilizer,” he observed;
it “does not of itself produce anything, but it stimulates growth and advance when
the live seed [of] practical experience is instilled into the soil.”42
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Wartime experiences inspired King to enter the fray in efforts to establish
higher professional education standards in the U.S. Navy. He first broadened the
Naval Postgraduate School curriculum, focusing on the mission of preparing
student practitioners for assignment to receive graduate education at civilian
universities. He fostered partnerships between the school and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Harvard, Columbia, Northwestern, the University of
Chicago, and the state universities of Iowa, Wisconsin, and Michigan. King developed the curriculum to focus on transcendent concepts of permanent value
rather than empirically framed staff school solutions. King assumed the function
of teacher, rather than examiner, at the school. His approach contrasted with the
traditional culture of military discipline that prevailed on “the Yard” at the Naval
Academy. In the spring of 1919, King solicited assistance from his mentors Mayo
and Sims.
While peace negotiations dragged on at Versailles, outside Paris, after the
armistice, USN forces demobilized from wartime operations and returned to
American waters. But in wartime propaganda Sims had attained heroic status as
the personality most associated with victory in the First World War and international fame as the widely mythologized personification of the spirit of future
Anglo-American collaboration. With Sims having been promoted from captain
in 1917 to four-star admiral by 1919, it appeared politically inevitable that he
would remain in four-star rank as Chief of Naval Operations.
However, after the American declaration of war Sims had performed his wartime service in a temporary status, so technically he remained in his permanent
assignment as President of the Naval War College. And over drinks with his
friend Knox in Paris in January 1919 Sims learned about the Navy Department’s
plans to proceed with the disestablishment of the separate Army and Navy War
Colleges; Captain William V. Pratt had written to Knox earlier about the plans
of Navy Secretary Daniels and Secretary of War Newton D. Baker to establish a
consolidated war college in Washington, DC. With this most recent news, Sims
requested immediate orders to return to the Naval War College. In the course
of his reassignment, he accepted demotion from his temporary wartime rank of
four stars to a permanent peacetime rank of two stars.43
Sims recruited his protégé Knox and his former intelligence officer in London,
Lieutenant Tracy Barrett Kittredge, to join the faculty of the College. Sharing
similar concerns about the future of professional education within the Navy, Sims
and Knox developed a strategy to save the Naval War College. Sims also worked
through the good offices of King at the Postgraduate School and Mayo on the
General Board in Washington. Together, they drew from the model that Sir Julian
Corbett had designed at the Admiralty in London, wherein historically trained
analysts associated with the Historical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/8
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examined issues of contemporary importance to the
RN staff. In June, Sims empowered Knox and Kittredge
to organize at the Naval War College an analogous subdivision known as the Historical Section. The section’s
immediate charter was to synthesize analytical requirements supporting the higher educational mission
to align with those of the Operations Navy (OpNav)
planning staff in Washington.
Rather than proffering overt challenges to the authority of Daniels or the Navy Department, Mayo and
Sims worked outside the General Board and the Naval
War College—through their protégés. Mayo and Sims
empowered these more junior officers to incite a bureaucratic revolution from below. Mayo acted through
King at the Postgraduate School in Annapolis to initiate actions, which provided the pretext for Sims in his
turn to initiate a study of the problem of education.44
Knox, the Naval War College chief of staff, recomLieutenant Tracy Barrett Kittredge, USNR.
mended the establishment of a board to study the critiCourtesy Branden Little
cal issues and offer recommendations for future action.
King subsequently shared Knox’s recommendations with the superintendent of
the Naval Academy, Rear Admiral Archibald H. Scales.45 In turn, Scales endorsed
the idea of organizing a board to examine the issues, offer findings, and provide
a strategy for professional education.46
This methodology granted Mayo and Sims bureaucratic immunity, as it was
Knox and King who influenced Scales to endorse a recommendation to the
Bureau of Navigation to establish a board consisting of Naval War College and
Naval Postgraduate School personnel to study the strategic problem of professional education. Knox worked the ropes with other members of the Naval
War College faculty while King and Pye gathered evidence to substantiate their
arguments.
In particular, King drew inspiration from the works of Professor Edgar James
Swift of Washington University in Saint Louis, Missouri. King would use Swift
and his 1918 book, Psychology and the Day’s Work: A Study in the Application of
Psychology to Daily Life, as tools in the longer battle for educational reform in
the Navy. King invited Swift to lecture at the Postgraduate School and influenced
Sims to sponsor Swift on a regular basis as a visiting lecturer at the Naval War
College. Swift offered a critical argument that not “until facts have been accumulated and ordered are suggestions that are worth while likely to appear.” He
maintained that “[k]nowledge gives the raw material for solving problems, but in
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addition to knowledge there must be a sensitive, open mind anxious to see things
as they are, instead of as we should wish them to be.”47
Meanwhile, the bureaucratic wheels of the Navy Department churned blindly
among the various bureaus. Since the establishment of the Navy Department in
1794, whenever the seagoing forces navigated the uncharted waters in the nexus
between peace and war, the department had followed a sustained administrative course fueled by politics and mediocrity. Having muddled through the First
World War, the Navy Department bureaucracy under Secretary Daniels settled
back into its traditional peacetime routines.
Before the First World War, Daniels had used naval education as a means to
amalgamate immigrants and the lower economic classes, encouraging them to
embrace their identity as American citizens. As part of shaping the future in
general, he considered the U.S. Navy an ideal platform to advance the broader
military policy of the United States. “It is my ambition to make the Navy a great
university,” Daniels reported, “with college extensions afloat and ashore.” He suggested that every warship “should be a school . . . [and] every enlisted man and
petty and warrant officer should receive the opportunity to improve his mind,
better his position, and fit himself for promotion.”48
Although Daniels somewhat shared Sims’s vision about the role of education,
their opinions on civil-military relations proved radically different. Daniels worried that Navy professionals might use education as a means to undermine traditional American civil-military ideals. He wanted the Navy to support education
to create American citizens, rather than merely to satisfy the applied purposes
of military or naval practitioners.49 Given these concerns, Daniels endorsed the
recommendation by the chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear Admiral Thomas
Washington, to organize a board comprising Knox, King, and Pye to examine the
question.
Traveling between Newport and Annapolis during the summer of 1919, Knox,
King, and Pye gathered their evidence. Knox later recalled the moment when
their report came together at King’s hand, explaining that while Knox “was theoretically the senior member . . . and many ideas were contributed by Pye,”
the principal man was King. After much deliberation, King suggested that we write
the report. King sat down at a desk and wrote that report in the course of perhaps a
day. Scarcely any change [was] made from [the] preliminary draft. He wrote it and
followed the details through in his logical way. The report came out of King’s head
primarily. There was a great deal of ground work by Pye, but the stringing together
and the argument that you make in such cases was all King’s. No one without outstanding ability could have done what he did there.50

King attempted to frame the board’s findings in objective, empirical terms
within a thirty-one-page treatise that bore the awkward title “Report and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss3/8

NWC_Summer2018Review.indb 134

14

5/1/18 11:11 AM

Kohnen: Charting a New Course: The Knox-Pye-King Board and Naval Professi

KO H N E N

135

Sims with Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the Navy Department in 1920.
U.S. Navy photograph

Recommendations of a Board Appointed by the Bureau of Navigation Regarding
the Instruction and Training of Line Officers.” The authors formally submitted
their findings to the Bureau of Navigation on October 16, 1919.
The original, typewritten report circulated among the various bureaus of the
Navy Department. While Admiral Washington acknowledged receipt of the report with thanks to Knox, King, and Pye, he considered their recommendations
impractical because they would have required the Navy Department to sustain
a forty-year strategy for educating individual naval practitioners throughout
their careers. He declared that inadequate bureaucratic and budgetary resources
to maintain educational programs ashore, amplified by the shortage of officer
personnel for service afloat, prevented the Bureau of Navigation from acting on
the board’s recommendations. Washington effectively suppressed the report; the
original vanished into the black hole of the Navy Department bureaucracy after
its last reported sighting in April 1920.51
Undeterred by the report’s purported loss, Knox and King conspired to force
the Navy Department to address the strategic problem of education within the
service. Acting with the confidence of their convictions, Knox and King launched
a bureaucratic revolution from below, within the ranks of the service. Six years
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Original signatures from K-P-K Report of 1919.
Library of Congress

earlier, on the advice of Sims and Knox, King had accepted the voluntary position
of secretary-treasurer of the Naval Institute. In this role, he edited and reviewed
articles in the institute’s professional journal Proceedings. Thus, King’s position
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was one of significant influence. Following the disappearance of the board’s original report to the Bureau of Navigation, King used a duplicate copy to arrange the
report’s publication in the Proceedings issue of August 1920.52 King later admitted
to “arranging” the publication of the report. In the published version, King added
the caveat “Published by permission of the Navy Department for the information
of the service. The Report of the Board has been approved, but the shortage of officers will not permit the recommendations to be carried into effect at present.”53
With some editorial adjustments, the published version in Proceedings reflected the original narrative of the typewritten original. Even though he was the
report’s primary author, King claimed no immediate responsibility for its publication; the article appeared in Proceedings without any attribution to authors.
Even so, the report would become widely known within the Navy as that of the
Knox-Pye-King Board, or K-P-K Board.54
In the article, the supplemental recommendations to the Navy Department
to take action on the question of education appeared in starkly framed prose.
Between the lines of the article’s narrative, the K-P-K Board railed against the
problems of bureaucracy, the dogmatic deference to doctrine among service
practitioners, and the coercive intent and power of orthodoxy in the education
of USN professionals.55 By its construction in two sections, the article makes the
assertions in the original report resonate more sharply.56 Unlike the published
Proceedings variation, the signed original reads like an indictment against the
bureaucratic culture of the Navy.
Given the timing of the article and Sims’s close association with the authors of
the K-P-K Board report, Secretary Daniels associated such criticisms with Sims.
In effect, Sims was daring Daniels to ignore the findings and recommendations
of the K-P-K Board—and the oily politician Daniels disliked the watery practitioner Sims for challenging the policies of the Navy Department. The ensuing
bureaucratic duels between Daniels and Sims became infamous, inspiring formal
congressional inquiries and embarrassing the Navy Department—but remained
a persistent influence on the development of the U.S. Navy.
The rivalry between Daniels and Sims must be considered when placing the
K-P-K Board report into the broader context of historical discussions concerning the still unresolved historical question of professional education and the U.S.
Navy. Notwithstanding that, the findings of the K-P-K Board defined a progressive vision of professional education. Publication of the report achieved the
K-P-K Board’s design: it sparked heated debate within the tribal culture of the
Navy about that progressive vision. Lines of division became clear as the debate
on naval education stratified relations between policy makers such as Secretary
Daniels and practitioners such as Admirals Mayo and Sims.
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Sims and the Naval War College class of 1923. Future Chiefs of Naval Operations Commander Chester W. Nimitz and Commander Harold R. Stark are at
fourth row, center, no. 54, and third row, fourth from left, no. 36, respectively.
Naval War College photograph

Ultimately, the K-P-K Board offered a coldly honest portrayal of fellow naval
professionals as being insufficiently prepared for the broad spectrum of challenges facing the naval profession. For those serving at the lowest levels to the
highest levels of command, the K-P-K Board provided a lasting warning against
allowing the U.S. Navy to sail under the command of officers who were “‘educated’ only to the lowest commissioned grade.” The solution to this fundamental
problem actually preceded the original setting out of the question, as Mayo and
Sims worked through Knox and King in a roundabout strategy to first acknowledge the problem of ignorance before addressing the transcendent question of
professional education within the Navy.
One emphasis in the report was a requirement for officers to attend the Naval
War College twice in their careers. The authors of the report led that charge;
for example, King completed the College’s correspondence course in 1924, then
graduated from the residence course in 1933. Among others, the K-P-K Board
directly influenced the Naval War College studies of future admirals Thomas
Hart, Harold Stark, Harry Yarnell, Edward C. Kalbfus, and Chester W. Nimitz.
With King orchestrating Anglo-American combined strategy and simulta
neously supervising U.S. naval operations on an unprecedented global scale after
1941, Knox attained one-star rank as a commodore while organizing the Office
of Naval History. In 1943, Knox and King again joined forces with the President
of the Naval War College, Pye, to revisit the question of professional education
in the U.S. Navy. Twenty-five years after the original K-P-K Report, Knox and
King contributed to the recommendations found in the “Pye Board” Report of
1944, which influenced combined and joint professional education into the Cold
War era.57
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By attacking the problem of education openly and without deference to
higher-ranking personalities or bureaucratic protocols, the K-P-K Board helped
place the U.S. Navy on the course that would educate the personnel who would
secure the strategic victories of the Second World War. Pursuant to the vision of
ensuring an American “navy second to none,” the K-P-K Board report remains a
critical foundation to establishing the fundamental role that higher professional
education has played in framing the future strategy of the U.S. Navy into the
twenty-first century and beyond.
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